Marcus Sacrini noematic sphere in the field of investigation) and I intend to show some connections with at least some of them. In order to complete these tasks, I plan to discuss two central texts to this change, namely, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic (1900) , introductory work to the Logical Investigations, and Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, a series of lectures given in 1906-7 wherein Husserl proposes a tacit reevaluation of some features of his earlier project outlined in the Prolegomena.
II. Phenomenology and pure logic

In this section, I intend to analyze the way Husserl presents phenomenology in the
Prolegomena. Phenomenology will be inserted in a general debate concerning the autonomy of logic. Husserl rejects founding logic on psychology and foresees an autonomous logical system (called -pure logic‖) that would establish the theoretical basis for any scientific discipline. 4 Let me outline the main traits of pure logic in order to introduce the specifically phenomenological issue in the Prolegomena.
Husserl first examines the manner in which scientific knowledge is obtained. The construction of scientific knowledge is, according to him, supported by logical methods that legitimate the acquisition of mediate knowledge on the basis of basic knowledge (which would be apprehended with immediate evidence). Thus, the examination of these logical methods of validation or foundation (Begründungen) will make clear the general norms for the construction of valid theories in all scientific areas. According to Husserl, the possibility of establishing such norms derives from three characteristics of the general methods of justification or foundation of knowledge (cf. Hua XVIII, §7) 5 : PhaenEx a) they are fixed structures, that is, a non-arbitrary sequence of procedures; b) these procedures can be used in different kinds of research; c) their form is independent of the material domain in which they are applied.
The scientific methods of foundation or justification are, thus, sets of fixed procedures whose validity is not connected to the concrete peculiarities of their application, and which are, therefore, formalizable. Such methods constitute the most general theoretical nucleus that renders the development of the different scientific investigations possible. For instance, the use of the axiomatic-deductive method guarantees the extraction of valid conclusions in the sphere of geometry, theoretical physics, and so on. Thus, the study of this kind of method in its formal purity (which includes the categories that compose them and the a priori laws that rule them)
circumscribes the domain of the -doctrine of science‖ [Wissenschaftslehre] (Logical Investigations 16; Hua XVIII 27.)-the investigation of that which gives sciences in general their scientificity. Given that the doctrine of science investigates the formal structures of the methods that constitute the theoretical nucleus of sciences (regardless of the domain to be investigated),
Husserl presents it as a logical discipline that aims at delimiting the basic concepts and rules that render every systematic or theoretical unity of knowledge possible (cf. Hua XVIII, §42) . This discipline is what Husserl calls pure logic.
6
Pure logic is then meant to establish the systemic forms and a priori laws that constitute the theoretical nucleus of every possible science. Husserl explicitly resumes here the Leibnizian ideal of a mathesis universalis, that is, of a universal knowledge with mathematical form and rigor (cf. Hua XVIII, §60). 7 The domain of pure logic is that of formal connections among the basic theoretical categories and propositions ordered in accordance with a priori laws (cf. Hua XVIII, §48). And its general task will partly be to ascend from the different theoretical connections valid as foundational methods to the final axioms upon which the systematic connections are based, and partly to make explicit the form of those connections. 8 The perfect theoretical form revealed by pure logic is the deductive structure based upon axioms and fundamental laws Hua XVIII 234.) . This is the form pure logic itself has, so that it founds itself. In other words, the systematic-deductive form of pure logic is itself governed by the a priori logic laws concerning deductive systematicity, laws that are themselves revealed by pure logic (Logical Investigations 104-5; Hua XVIII 165).
It should be noted that pure logic analyzes not only the basic concepts of scientific methods and their deductive propositional linkages, but also formal properties and relations established among the objects possibly referred to by them. An object, be it empirical or ideal, can be counted, can be put in relationship with similar ones, etc. In this case, one deals with basic characteristics, under which the very notion of object is constructed. The study of such characteristics constitutes a formal ontology, that is, a part of pure logic that analyses the conceptual components of any kind of object that can be referred to by propositions in any conceivable material or ideal domain (cf. Hua XVIII, §70).
9
Ideal truths and laws established by pure logic are the objective conditions of scientific theories in general. In order to warrant being designated as scientific, every theory must be formally structured according to deductive connections revealed by pure logic. 10 In addition to this, Husserl enumerates subjective conditions that must be fulfilled for the theoretical-objective content of sciences to be apprehended as knowledge. Every theoretical objective unity must be included in that which subjectivity is able to know. If subjectivity could not recognize the objective character of the components of pure logic, then it would not be possible to develop it as a true logical theory. Accordingly, one must consider the subjective capacities of Hua XVIII 193) . And this possibility of evident givenness of the truth contained in the judgments making up a theory is, according to Husserl, a basic subjective condition for the establishment of knowledge.
Even pure logic, the universal theory of the forms of possible theories, must respect the subjective conditions of evidence. After all, as Husserl recognizes, the theory of theories is also knowledge, and therefore must be given in an experience of evident cognitive justification (cf.
Hua XVIII, §32). However, pure logic in itself, at least as a purely objective mathesis universalis, says nothing about the conditions of its own epistemic justification. Such a mathesis specifies the basic axioms and the a priori valid propositional linkages, which attribute a theoretical form to any scientific investigation, and, in themselves, these axioms and linkages do not refer to the cognitive subject. Accordingly, it is necessary to complement pure logic with another kind of investigation, which addresses the evident givenness of the objective content of theories to the cognitive subject. It is exactly here that the specificity of phenomenological investigation becomes clear, that is, it is exactly from the need of correlating logical truths and laws defined as objectively valid with the cognitive subject that the phenomenological set of problems will be brought together for the first time. 
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The analysis of the noetic conditions of theories will not be a task for experimental or empirical psychology. For Husserl, empirical psychology is a science that investigates facts of human psychic life, and therefore relates to certain empirical constraints through which some real possibilities (some facts, some states of things) occur. By contrast, noetic conditions are related to structures that allow the evident apprehension of objective data. These structures However, besides such real conditions, Husserl focuses on ideal subjective conditions, which do not refer to the actual subjects but to the structures of any possible consciousness, to the general form of subjectivity.
The description of the noetic conditions of pure logic is the first phenomenological task formulated by Husserl in his work as a whole. This intentional character of noetic structures indicates that they are not isolated entities, but that they are always directed to some content. In the Prolegomena, Husserl is interested in unveiling the intentional structures related to the objective components of pure logic. This aim is clearly formulated in a passage added in the second edition of the Prolegomena. In §67 Husserl specifies that the achievement of the tasks of pure logic (for instance, the determination of the pure categories of signification and their deductive valid linkages) demands going back to the -phenomenological origin‖ (Logical Investigations 153; Hua XVIII 246); 15 in other words, it demands clarifying how such categories can be evidently given to the noetically considered subjectivity.
This reference to the noetic origin makes up the core of Husserl's first conception of the tasks of phenomenology. According to him, mathematicians are responsible for developing the logical-objective content of pure logic. However, they do their work without ever questioning the subjective principles that guarantee the legitimacy of their theories, that is, without being concerned about clarifying the conditions of their evident apprehension. 16 The philosopher should therefore complement the mathematician's work with an investigation of those subjective structures that allow the evident recognition of mathematical results. Philosophy thus performs the work of a -critique of knowledge‖ (Logical Investigations 160; Hua XVIII 256) , that is, a clarification of the subjective sources that attribute legitimacy and therefore rationally justify objective knowledge. It is then the task of philosophy to investigate the noetic conditions of the objective mathesis universalis, to investigate, in their eidetic purity, the intentional structures that grant access to logical idealities.
This is the project formulated in the Prolegomena, which is to be completed in Logical
Investigations. In the Prolegomena Husserl only outlines the domain of pure logic and recognizes the need to complement this objective doctrine of science with the phenomenological description of the acts in which knowledge is obtained, a description that is gradually presented throughout the following six investigations. It is true that this complementation of pure logic is intended to function as a phenomenological foundation of the doctrine of science. As we have seen, pure logic does not deal with the subjective conditions of its own affirmation as a true theory. And it is necessary here to appeal to a phenomenological investigation of the noetic structures in order to establish the epistemic legitimacy of pure logic. Despite this important role ascribed to phenomenology in the Prolegomena, some years later, in Introduction to Logic and
Theory of Knowledge (hereafter, ILTK), Husserl admits that noetic analyses (identified in the
Prolegomena with phenomenology in general) do not form an autonomous discipline, since they are dependent on pure logic. This dependence appears as a limitation in reference to the general task of clarifying all possible knowledge, a task taken up by Husserl in ILTK that leads him to develop the transcendental phenomenology, as I intend to make explicit in the next section.
III. Phenomenology as a universal science of pure consciousness
Initially, in ILTK, Husserl reproduces the path of the Prolegomena. In the first section of his 1906-7 lectures, he emphasizes that logical methods of justification are independent of the scientific domains in which they are applied, which makes it possible to thematize them in an autonomous manner. It is precisely by examining and establishing these methods in their general theoretical aspect that the doctrine of science is constituted as a discipline directed to the formal structures embodied in particular scientific investigations (Hua XXIV, §10) . Here one has to notice that the independence of philosophy in regard to scientific results also applies to pure logic. For Husserl, even pure logic, in its formal-objective dimension, is constructed naively in that which concerns the problem of the possibility of knowledge. The objects of pure logic are the logical idealities, which are posited in their objectivity without the clarification of the subjective conditions that make possible the recognition of such an objectivity. According to Husserl, the mathematicians, who should develop pure logic, do not need ultimate clarity about the meaning, limits, and sources of the objective validity of what is mathematical. They are oriented towards the mathematical as a preestablished objective. They do not inquire reflectively into the subjective sources and ultimate questions about the meaning and possibility of an objectivity constituting itself subjectively. (ILTK 161; Hua XXIV 163) In pure logic, as in every other science, the tools of research and reflection are turned to the objects to be investigated, certain theses are formulated, and with them theories are constructed, in which the knowledge of such objects is systematized. In this naive way of proceeding -one thinks, knows, and works scientifically without investigating the principles upon which meaning, legitimacy, the source of truly objective validity ultimately everywhere hinge‖ (ILTK 162; Hua XXIV 164 By contrast, the transcendental question of the possibility of knowledge is developed outside of the natural attitude of thought. Husserl imagines the possibility of a complete development of the theories of pure mathematics, so as to exhaust in perfectly finished scientificity the entire domain it should investigate. Even in this case, -the problems of critique of knowledge would, though, still be precisely the same‖ (ILTK 186; Hua XXIV 190) , for the theoretical perfection of pure mathematics -would be a fact and nothing more. Upon reflection, it would be a problem‖ (ILTK 186; Hua XXIV 190) . That is, philosophical reflection would not be satisfied even with exhaustive objective knowledge of a domain, because it is interested not in the fact of establishing or stating knowledge, but in the problem of its correctness, or, in other words, in the pure possibility of establishing valid relations between subjectivity and objectivity.
In the last two paragraphs, I tried to show that the transcendental investigation is developed independently of the objective production of knowledge by the sciences, pure logic included. It should be noted now that Husserl does not consider noetic analysis to be autonomous regarding pure logic. As Husserl admits in ILTK, -formal logic and noetic logic are most intimately connected. The former can certainly be worked on independently of the latter, but not the other way around‖ (ILTK 156; Hua XXIV 158). Such dependence results from the fact that noetic analysis aims at making explicit the subjective acts in which the contents of pure logic can be stated in a justified manner, a task that supposes the previous development of logical themes to which this analysis is applied. Noetic investigations are, therefore, always correlated with what was objectively developed by the logicians or mathematicians who work in the field of pure logic.
One can already find this dependence in the Prolegomena, especially in § 71, where
Husserl presents a division of the tasks that compose the doctrine of science. Mathematicians would develop the objective topics of pure logic (formalization of the methods of validating knowledge and formulation of their general laws) and the philosophers, by means of the phenomenological method, would make explicit the eidetic subjective structures that attest to the validity of such objective topics. According to this way of presenting the tasks of the doctrine of science, philosophers receive their starting point from mathematicians, and, in this sense, the development of objective, pure logic conditions the noetic analyses. But this is not the case in transcendental investigation, which must be developed in an autonomous way in regard to the concrete development of pure logic and sciences in general.
According to Husserl, the first step to developing a transcendental investigation is to exclude all objective knowledge (including that which constitutes pure logic) from the inquiry.
As Husserl explains it, -no naturally obtained scientific result is free of [unclarity] . Therefore, we cannot use any as a premise out of which to derive what we are looking for: the answer to these questions‖ (ILTK 174; Hua XXIV 177) . Here the epoché (the suspension of judgment regarding the validity of all scientific knowledge previously given in experience) is performed (Hua XXIV, §33b) . Thus, the transcendental critique of knowledge is not based upon any scientific knowledge, and, accordingly, scientific achievements or findings do not contribute in any respect to addressing such a critique. As the aim is to clarify how the relation between subjectivity and objectivity is possible, one should not use as a starting point any knowledge in which such possibility is taken for granted, since, unlike the naive man, the phenomenologist should make explicit this possibility, and not produce objective knowledge using it as an implicit premise. It means here that the philosophical investigation is no longer dependent on the progress of pure logic. Like any other scientific theory, pure logic will have its objective validity suspended and their results cannot be a presupposition of the transcendental inquiry 18 .
Through the epoché, Husserl suspends the validity of all scientific judgments and of all objectivity posited by them. What is left is precisely the phenomenon of science, the set of theories composed by claims intended to be true. 19 A reduction of all activity of knowledge to that which manifests itself in a purely phenomenal way is performed here, without any assumption about the objectivity of what is supposedly known. Husserl then completes the -phenomenological reduction‖ (ILTK 206; Hua XXIV 211) , that is, the disclosing of the pure phenomenality, which resists the epoché. Absolute knowledge, in this case, is that whose own sources of possibility are clarified.
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The data obtained by means of the phenomenological reduction would be free of any transcendent presupposition concerning their objective existence (which is suspended by epoché). Such data are reduced to their pure appearing to consciousness and, if properly described, they allow us to acquire insight about the general subjective conditions that must be fulfilled for something to be known. In the sphere of pure phenomenal data, Husserl believes, PhaenEx Transcendental phenomenology can now be conceived of as the science intending to examine the correlative eidetic structures (involving subjective acts and pure phenomena)
comprising the general meaning of any lived experience. Its task is to reflexively investigate the eidetic laws regarding pure subjective capacities and their intentional objects. These laws can be examined for any phenomenologically reduced experience, and this certainly includes the sphere of logical knowledge, such as circumscribed in the Prolegomena. Thus, the task of clarification of pure logic is assumed by Husserl's transcendental project. However, it is important to highlight that transcendental phenomenology studies different fields of human life. In any kind of experience (affective, axiological, etc.) the naively transcendent objectivity can be traced back to the principles and a priori laws that make them possible. Husserl, thus, envisions the project of a critique of reason in its totality, not limited to knowledge but extended to all domains of subjective experience 24 .
IV. Conclusion
I tried to show that, around 1906, Husserl presents phenomenology as an investigation which is far from following the mathematical developments of pure logic, but which aims at clarifying the eidetic laws that illuminate the meaning and possibility of the correlation between subjective acts and intentional objects in every realm of experience. This is the general project whereby phenomenology is conceived as an autonomous transcendental discipline. However, there are some problems in this project. As a transcendental investigation, phenomenology must not use any pre-given knowledge whose possibility is not clarified. that logic cannot be put into brackets, and at least regarding this discipline phenomenology is not completely independent from it.
I think that the thorny problem at stake here is not solved in ILTK. As we have seen, in this text the requirement of presuppositionlessness as a mark of transcendental investigation already is at work (cf. ILTK 362-364; Hua XXIV 368-370). But there is still no detailed consideration on the role of basic logic rules (systematized by pure logic) as presuppositions of the phenomenological discourse. It seems that Husserl will present publically a satisfactory solution to this problem only in § 59 of Ideas I. There, he states that although the transcendental investigation should not presuppose pure logic as a datum, it does not mean that its results are illogical, since the most basic logical principles are immediately attested in experience and given with absolute evidence. Thus, these basic logical principles are not presuppositions of the phenomenological description of experience, but, on the contrary, they are intuitively posited in this description. Based on these evident principles, phenomenology can formulate its theses, which, in general, do without complex deductive chains. Thus, it is true that around 1906-7 transcendental phenomenology is already conceived as independent of the objective validity of pure logic. However, the full clarity regarding what is implied in this independence (e.g., how to warrant the logical coherence of the transcendental description so conceived) took some years to be grasped by Husserl.
9 Regarding this topic, see Smith. 10 Husserl admits that the definition of scientificity as a deductive systemic unity of propositions derived from apodictic principles cannot be fully fulfilled for all existing sciences. Only abstract or nomological sciences (which suppose a priori laws as unifying principles) can properly express such logical content of scientificity. Those sciences (formal Mathematics, mathematical Physics, a priori Mechanics, etc.) are developed on the sole basis of categorical and ontological pure concepts, without any reference to a determinate material region. This is not what happens with empirical sciences, which are always opened to new evidence acquired by experience. Yet, Husserl believes there should be an ideal theoretical character ruling over the development of those theories, namely, the laws of probability (Hua XVIII, §72) . In the present article I shall not explore the difficulties concerning the role of empirical sciences in the doctrine of science. Moreover, it is not completely clear in the Prolegomena what the theoretical specificity of phenomenology itself is. Husserl presents phenomenology as a descriptive discipline, as we shall see, but he does not discuss extensively the relationships between the phenomenological description and the validation methods studied by the doctrine of science. It seems to me that this topic will be explicitly developed by Husserl only in §71-75 of Ideas I. I am also not exploring this topic in this article.
11 -As far as evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also‖ (Logical Investigations 18; Hua XVIII 29).
12 -By the subjective conditions of possibility, we do not mean here real conditions rooted in the individual judging subject, or in the varied species of judging beings (e. g. human beings), but ideal conditions whose roots lie in the form of subjectivity as such, and in its relation to knowledge. We shall distinguish them by speaking of noetic conditions‖ (Logical Investigations 76; Hua XVIII 119).
13 As R. Schérer already noted years ago, -the problem around which phenomenology is born is that of the nature of subjectivity to which truth can be given as such‖ (28).
14 H. Spiegelberg points out that, besides authors of the Hegelian school, Brentano, Mach and Hering already used the term before Husserl, though with a different meaning (Spielberg 8, 53 ).
